ISSN 0042-0018
Vol. 39, Issue 1, 2004January 01, 2004 PDT
Economic Analyses of Patent Settlement Agreements: The Implementation of Specific Economic Tests, the Evaluation of Dynamic Efficiency, and the Scope of Patent Rights
Economic Analyses of Patent Settlement Agreements: The Implementation of Specific Economic Tests, the Evaluation of Dynamic Efficiency, and the Scope of Patent Rights
James Langenfeld, Wenqing Li,
Articles in Vol. 39, Issue 1, 2004
Vol. 39, Issue 1, 2004
- Sensible Antitrust Rules for Pharmaceutical CompetitionHerbert Hovenkamp
- Efficiency Trade-Offs in Patent Litigation Settlements: Analysis Gone Astray?Keith LefflerCristofer Leffler
- Economic Analyses of Patent Settlement Agreements: The Implementation of Specific Economic Tests, the Evaluation of Dynamic Efficiency, and the Scope of Patent RightsJames LangenfeldWenqing Li
- The Superiority of Direct Proof of Monopoly Power and Anticompetitive Effects in Antitrust Cases Involving Delayed Entry of Generic DrugsEric L. CramerDaniel Berger
- Chimerical Class Conflicts in Federal Antitrust Litigation: The Fox Guarding the Chicken House in Valley DrugJoshua P. DavisDavid F Sorensen
- Avoiding Furman: The Unconstitutionality of Mississippi’s Killing to Avoid Arrest AggravatorJames Higgins
- Losing the Nuptials in Loss of Consortium: Correcting California’s Common Law ClaimGary Johnston Jr.
- Occupation Law and Foreign Investment in Iraq: How an Outdated Doctrine Has Become an Obstacle to Occupied PopulationsRobert D. Tadlock
James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Economic Analyses of Patent Settlement Agreements: The Implementation of Specific Economic Tests, the Evaluation of Dynamic Efficiency, and the Scope of Patent Rights, 39 U.S.F. L. Rev. 3 (2004).